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Abstract
In this study, we provide the conceptual background, meta-analyze avail-
able behavioral management studies (N = 72) in organizational settings, 
and examine whether combined reinforcement effects on task performance 
are additive (sum of individual effects), redundant (combined effects are 
less than the additive effects), or synergistic (combined effects are greater 
than the sum of the individual effects). We found a significant overall aver-
age effect size of (d.) = .47 (16% improvement in performance; 63% prob-
ability of success), and a significant within-group heterogeneity of effect 
sizes. To account for this variation, we conducted a theory-driven modera-
tor analysis, which indicated that money, feedback, and social recognition 
each had a significant impact on task performance. However, when these 
3 reinforcers were used in combination, they produced the strongest (syn-
ergistic) effect on task performance. Based on our findings, we offer direc-
tions for future research, and suggestions for effective application of behav-
ioral management at work. 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
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Both scholars and practitioners recognize that for today’s organi-
zations to attain competitive advantage, a skilled work force, cut-
ting edge technological proficiency, exemplary customer service, and 
higher quality products and services are needed (O’Reilly & Pfef-
fer, 2000). Because these demands require high employee motiva-
tion and effort, the critical factor in gaining distinctive competen-
cies in today’s era of global hypercompetitiveness seems to be on 
the human side of organizations (Argyris, 1993; Pfeffer, 1995,1998). 
Most managers of today’s organizations would agree, and research 
is demonstrating, that employees drive success, whether that be de-
fined as productivity, customer satisfaction, or even profits (Harter, 
Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002). However, although this message seems 
clear, as Pfeffer (1995,1998) suggests, the real challenge is in find-
ing specific, empirically supported ways to motivate employees for 
improved performance (see also Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Luthans & 
Stajkovic, 1999; Pfeffer, 2001). 
Behavioral management, which has been around for about 3 de-
cades, is one approach to improving performance at work (Frederik-
sen, 1982; Komaki, 1986; Luthans & Kreitner, 1975, 1985; Luthans & 
Stajkovic, 1999). The main premise of behavioral management is that 
employee behavior is a function of contingent consequences (Bandura, 
1969; Komaki, Coombs, & Schepman, 1996; Pfeffer, 1995). Simply, be-
haviors that positively effect performance must be contingently rein-
forced. Contingently administered money, feedback, and social recog-
nition are the most recognized reinforcers in behavioral management 
at work (Bandura, 1986; Huger & DeNisi, 1996; Mitchell & Mickel, 
1999; Rynes & Gerhart, 2000; Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001).1
Although widely recognized and applied in organizations, behav-
ioral management still produces lingering questions regarding its con-
ceptual background and empirical effectiveness. Conceptually, on the 
1. We base our terminology on reinforcement theory, where the term reward is not 
the same as reinforcer, and hence, rewarding is not the same as reinforcing. A re-
ward is something that is valuable to the reward giver, whereas a reinforcer is 
something that increases the desired behavioral response. Thus, a reward is not 
necessarily a reinforcer, nor is a reinforcer necessarily a reward. However, only a 
reinforcer increases desired behavioral response  (see Luthans & Kreitner, 1975, 
1985; Luthans & Stajkovic, 1999; Skinner, 1969).
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one hand, there seems to be general agreement regarding the validity 
of the principle of contingent reinforcement (Bandura, 1969; Pfeffer, 
1995; Vroom, 1964). On the other hand, behavioral management has 
generated theoretical disagreements regarding its main premise that 
behavior is solely a function of contingent consequences. To illustrate, 
although Vroom (1964) states that “without a doubt.. .the principle of 
reinforcement must be included among the most substantiated find-
ings in experimental psychology and is at the same time among the 
most useful findings for applied psychology.. . ” (p. 13), Locke (1997) 
suggests that we “can refute the entire enterprise with 30 seconds of 
introspection” (p. 376).2
Empirically, Bandura (1986) suggests that “If people acted. . . on 
the basis of informative cues but remained unaffected by the results 
of their actions, they would be insensitive to survive very long” (p. 
228). Yet, questions remain regarding the overall impact of various re-
inforcers on task performance in organizations (e.g., Welsh, Luthans, 
& Sommer, 1993). In fact, although there have been numerous con-
ceptual reviews (e.g., Andrasik, 1989; Heneman, & VonHippel, 1997; 
Komaki et al., 1996; Merwin, Thomason, & Sanford, 1989; O’Hara, 
Johnson, & Beehr, 1985) and analyses of more limited subsets of the 
literature (e.g., Andrasik, 1979,1989; Gupta & Shaw, 1998; Stajkovic 
& Luthans, 1997), no study has yet quantitatively synthesized, ana-
lyzed, and evaluated the variations in effect sizes of the behavioral 
management impact on task performance across all available studies 
conducted in organizational settings. 
The purpose of this study is to meta-analytically examine, in terms 
of applications at work, important, yet still open, research questions 
regarding: (a) the average individual effects of the three reinforcers 
(money, feedback, social recognition) on work performance, (b) the 
average combined effects of reinforcers on work performance (e.g., 
money, feedback, and social recognition combined), and, importantly, 
(c) the average relative impact of individual (e.g., money) versus com-
bined (e.g., money, feedback, social recognition) effects of reinforcers 
2. Current arguments (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1998; DeGrandpre, 2000), are largely 
reminiscent of those from 20 years ago (Locke, 1977; Luthans & Smith, 1980), 
which followed the original controversy in psychology over behaviorism (see Skin-
ner, 1938).
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on task performance at work. The latter analysis tests whether com-
bined reinforcement effects on task performance in organizations are 
additive, redundant, or synergistic. The lack of knowledge regarding 
these questions poses difficulties for researchers and practitioners to 
accurately predict what to expect (in terms of average effects) from 
behavioral management in organizations. At this point, where average 
quantitative estimates based on generalizations from multiple stud-
ies are called for, a theory-driven meta-analysis provides the method 
to address unresolved research questions regarding the effectiveness 
of behavioral management at work. 
We organize this article into three parts. First, we review the con-
ceptual background of behavioral management, followed by the pro-
posed theory regarding the different motivational nature of individual 
reinforcers and their combined effectiveness. Second, we test hypoth-
eses in primary and moderator meta-analyses, and by meta-analytic 
orthogonal polynomials. Finally, based on our findings, we suggest di-
rections for future theory development and research, and offer sug-
gestions for more effective management of task performance in to-
day’s organizations. 
Theoretical Foundation of Behavioral Management 
Main Premises of Behavioral Management 
Behavioral management is based on reinforcement theory, with its his-
toric roots in Skinner’s (1938) operant conditioning and Thorndike’s 
(1913) law of effect. The behavioral approach to work motivation as-
sumes that the causal agents of human action are found in the func-
tional relationship between environmental variables (e.g., reinforc-
ers) and the behavior they affect (e.g., Komaki et al., 1996). Applying 
this approach, behavioral managers would specify: (a) the occasion 
upon which desired employee behavior occurs, (b) the behavior itself, 
and (c) the behavioral consequences. The behavioral management lit-
erature interprets these contingencies as antecedent-behavior-conse-
quence or simply A-B-C (Luthans & Kreitner, 1985). 
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Types of Reinforcers and Reinforcement 
Behavioral management is primarily concerned with employee 
learning as behavioral change through the consequences of reinforc-
ers and positive reinforcement. In particular, a reinforcer represents 
a desired consequence by an employee that, when added to the situa-
tion, increases the frequency of an employee’s task-related behavior. 
A positive reinforcement (most commonly used technique in behav-
ioral management) is an application of a positive reinforcer upon de-
sired employee behavior. Thus, in behavioral management, the unit of 
analysis is employee behavior, direct measurement of the frequency 
of behavior is needed, and behavior is functionally analyzed in terms 
of its antecedents and consequences (Luthans & Kreitner, 1985). 
Effectiveness of Behavioral Management at Work 
Notwithstanding an outlying view of Kohn (1993), few (i.e., Deci, 1971) 
would question the idea that contingent consequences positively im-
pact performance. As Bandura (1986) notes, “social scientists who 
warn that high pay will ruin the interest and motivation of … work-
ers, rarely counsel low reward of professional services and creative 
efforts” (p. 236). Therefore, based on the conceptual foundation of 
behavioral management and the considerable existing empirical evi-
dence in terms of individual studies (see the 72 asterisked studies in 
the reference section that are used in this meta-analysis), we hypoth-
esize that: 
Hypothesis I: Behavioral management has a positive effect on 
task performance in organizational settings. 
This hypothesis establishes the average effect of behavioral man-
agement over the years on task performance in organizations. How-
ever, the effect magnitudes of the impact of behavioral management 
on task performance depend on the type and amount of reinforcers ap-
plied (e.g., Bandura, 1969, 1986; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997, 2001). As 
we note in the introduction, the most commonly applied reinforcers in 
organizations are money, feedback, social recognition, and their com-
binations (Bandura, 1986; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Pfeffer, 1995; 
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Rynes & Gerhart, 2000; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997, 2001). Thus, given 
the large number, types, and amounts of analyzed reinforcers in this 
meta-analysis, we next hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: Magnitudes of individual effect sues are signif-
icantly heterogeneous across the initially analyzed behavioral 
management studies. 
This hypothesis suggests that behavioral management effect size 
magnitudes would deviate among each other beyond chance, depend-
ing on the reinforcer applied. This type of hypothesis is common in 
meta-analysis (Hedges and Olkin, 1985) and is used to rule out the 
false-positive findings regarding the within-group heterogeneity as-
sumption and subsequent waste of time and effort. In other words, a 
nonsignificant within-group heterogeneity of effect sizes in this analy-
sis would indicate that all reinforcers, regardless of their type such as 
money, feedback, or social recognition, produce statistically the same 
effects, and that it makes no difference empirically which one is ap-
plied in organizations. However, because we hypothesize the presence 
of moderation (significant heterogeneity of effect sizes), we next con-
ceptually suggest the sources of systematic variation among the ex-
amined studies. 
Effects of Different Reinforcers on Task Performance 
In the following sections, we provide a theoretical basis for the pro-
posed moderation regarding the impact of behavioral management 
on task performance. We base our arguments on the theory and re-
search of behavioral management (e.g., Komaki, 1986; Luthans & Kre-
itner, 1985), social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986, 1997, 2001), the 
compensation literature (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Rynes & Ger-
hart, 2000), and recent research on incentive motivators (Stajkovic 
& Luthans, 2001). In short, this literature has one common premise: 
“Human behavior.. . cannot be fully understood without considering 
the regulatory influence of response consequences” (Bandura, 1986, 
p. 228). However, the behavioral management approach has not yet 
provided conceptual explanation as to the reasons different reinforc-
ers may have differential effects on performance (hence, the “athe-
oretical” criticism frequently levied at this field). Thus, we propose 
Sta jkovic  &  Luthans  in  Personnel  Psycholo gy  56   (2003)       7
a theoretical model suggesting that different response consequences 
such as money, feedback, and social recognition produce different ef-
fects on task performance depending on their content properties. Fig-
ure 1 shows the model that summarizes our conceptual arguments. 
Given the relative novelty of the proposed theoretical model, it is 
important to note that we do not use it to meta-analytically test its me-
diating effects, for no data from individual studies are yet available. 
Rather, we use the proposed model as a conceptual vehicle to show 
why we believe that work motivation based on the contingent conse-
quences requires the presence of all three main reinforcers (money, 
feedback, social recognition) for most effective performance. Specif-
ically, although we maintain that each of the three reinforcers will 
significantly impact task performance, we suggest that the strongest 
effect will be attained by the simultaneous application of the three re-
inforcers combined, and that this effect will be synergistic. 
To illustrate, given its wide exchange properties, it is reasonable 
to assume in most instances that employees may perceive money as 
having high instrumental value, worth extra effort to increase perfor-
mance and attain the monetary reinforcement. However, many times, 
despite the willingness to extend effort, employees may not be sure 
what needs to be done, where to turn for resources, and how to correct 
unproductive behaviors. Application of feedback is needed in these 
instances to clarify the work role, which further facilitates the task 
performance (Bandura, 1997; Phillips, Hollenbeck, & Ilgen, 1996). Fi-
nally, in their work, many employees have learned that valuable out-
comes tend to occur in conjunction with or following the approval of 
Figure 1. The Nature of the Three Reinforcers. Dich. = Dichotomous.
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others, and aversive consequences tend to follow social disapproval 
(Bandura, 1986). Social recognition, therefore, further motivates em-
ployees based on its power to predict potentially upcoming desirable 
outcomes (promotion, pay raise, transfer to a better job assignment, 
etc.), which fosters the behaviors that received social approval (Ban-
dura, 1986). 
Unique Motivational Properties of the Three Major Reinforcers 
In the above discussion, we suggest that, although necessary, each 
reinforcer alone is not sufficient for the most effective performance. 
This is because the three reinforcers conceptually differ. Each contrib-
utes unique motivational elements to the contingent consequences 
motivational domain. As proposed by Stajkovic and Luthans (2001), 
these unique motivational properties proposed are based on the dif-
ferences among the three reinforcers in their (a) outcome utility, (b) 
informative content, and (c) mechanisms through which they influ-
ence performance. 
Money 
Outcome utility. Although many forms of monetary contingencies 
(e.g., prizes, lotteries, paid vacation, time off) have been used in be-
havioral management, cash payments have been the monetary re-
ward of choice to most organizations (Merwin et al., 1989; Mitchell 
& Mickel, 1999). Regarding the outcome utility, tangible, financially 
based rewards (e.g., prizes) effect action through benefits they pro-
vide upon consumption. However, the motivating power of money is 
in its exchange value, for it can be exchanged for different goods and 
services (Bandura, 1986). Given the exchange potential of money, em-
ployees are typically attracted to financial incentives and are likely to 
become dissatisfied if these are threatened or taken away. 
Informative value. Another characteristic of monetary contingen-
cies is that they do not provide much substantive information con-
cerning performance. The receipt of money may indicate a job well 
done, but it is up to the recipients to determine what they did well (or 
not so well) because money does not possess much informative value 
beyond a good–bad dichotomy (“I must have performed well having 
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been given this financial reward,” or vice versa). Thus, money does 
not provide much specific information regarding the nature of the per-
formance-standard discrepancy (what went wrong/was done right), 
and it does not provide any task information that could be used in im-
proving subsequent task performance (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001). 
Regulatory mechanism. Considering the mechanism through which 
it impacts human action, money can take on instrumental or symbolic 
motivational properties (Gupta & Shaw, 1998; Stajkovic & Luthans, 
2001). If perceived in its instrumental mode, money can be used to 
satisfy physical or psychological needs. If perceived as a valued social 
symbol, money provides a potent source of social-comparison infor-
mation (Festinger, 1957), which can indicate a person’s standing (e.g., 
status) relative to comparison others. In either case, money plays a 
vital role in determining which activities will be initiated, the expen-
diture of effort, and persistence. 
Feedback 
Outcome utility. Although feedback can be conveyed in a variety of 
different forms and ways (Annett, 1969; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996), it 
usually refers to information regarding the level of performance out-
comes, and/or the manner and efficiency in which performance pro-
cesses have been executed (Early, Northcraft, Lee, & Lituchy, 1990; 
Williams & Luthans, 1992). Feedback derives its motivating power 
almost exclusively from the information it provides about the em-
ployee’s performance, which, in turn, enhances role clarity about 
the task performed (Bandura, 1986; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Komaki, 
Heinzmann, & Lawson, 1980). To achieve role clarity, performance 
feedback needs to be: (a) operationalized as an external interven-
tion, (b) conveyed in a positive manner, (c) immediate, and (d) spe-
cific (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001). 
Informative content. Even though feedback information generally 
conveys more task-specific information to the employee than either 
money or social recognition, there are still variations in the level of 
information depending on whether outcome or process feedback has 
been delivered (Williams & Luthans, 1992). Outcome feedback conveys 
to the employee only the discrepancies between the level of perfor-
mance and the desired performance standard. In addition to this in-
formation, process feedback includes communicating to the employee 
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how the performance was executed (e.g., what were the critical task 
behaviors), and, importantly, what could be done in the future to im-
prove the performance (e.g., what may be the better sequencing of 
behaviors, and what are the dynamic complexities where sequencing 
may need to change) (Balcazar, Hopkins, & Suarez, 1986; Early et al., 
1990; Komaki, Heinzmann, & Lawson, 1980; Kopelman, 1986). 
Regulatory mechanism. In terms of its cognitive mechanism, feed-
back regulates human action through a feedback-standard discrep-
ancy process (Bandura, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Hollenbeck, 
1989; Locke & Latham, 1990). In particular, the receipt of feedback 
initiates an evaluative process whereby current performance is com-
pared to an objective standard of performance. If a discrepancy is dis-
cerned, behavior is altered in an effort to minimize the discrepancy. 
However, although feedback is largely recognized as a way to poten-
tially improve performance (Huger & DeNisi, 1996; Kopelman, 1986; 
Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997), and there is a widely held agreement that 
feedback regulates action by initiating the evaluation of and stimulat-
ing the reaction to the feedback standard discrepancy, no agreement 
exists regarding explanations of the reaction to it (see Ashford & Cum-
mings, 1983; Bandura, 1986, Carver, 1979; Hollenbeck, 1989; Locke & 
Latham, 1990; Phillips et al., 1996, for details). 
Social Recognition 
Outcome utility. Social recognition has recently been increasingly 
used as a behavioral management intervention in organizations (Lu-
thans & Stajkovic, 2000). This is due in part to the fact that money 
is often awarded on a less than contingent basis (e.g., seniority pay) 
and under less discretion (Bandura, 1986), and that social recognition 
costs the organization financially much less while promising similar 
results. Social recognition includes personal attention through the 
use of verbal consequences including expressions of approval, inter-
est, and compliments (Bandura, 1986; Haynes, Pine, & Fitch, 1982; 
Luthans & Stajkovic, 2000). 
Social recognition derives motivation potential from its predictive 
value and, importantly, not from the social reactions themselves (Ban-
dura, 1986; Luthans & Stajkovic, 2000). Because desired personal con-
sequences (e.g., promotion, raise) are usually preceded by social ap-
proval, by reversing the correlates, positive reactions of relevant others 
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become predictors of valuable rewards, and, thus, become incentives 
for future action. As a result, people are likely to engage in behaviors 
that receive social recognition and weaken those behaviors that lead 
to disapproval and/or criticism of others (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997). 
In other words, social reactions to performance become a predictor of 
future rewards, which, in turn, strengthens one’s behavior. 
Informative content. Similar to money, social recognition does not 
entail much of the informative task-related content that may be use-
ful for the direct improvement of performance. However, whereas the 
value of money is differentiated by the amount, the informative value 
of social recognition focuses on the content value of what has been de-
livered and not necessarily on the quantity of appreciation. In partic-
ular, showing employees how much their work is valued through so-
cial recognition is not achieved by using noncontingent standardized 
phrases (good job!), but by the acts of recognition that convey genu-
ine personal involvement, appreciation, and gratitude for the success-
ful performance. This is because indiscriminate approval that does 
not eventually result in tangible benefits becomes an “empty reward,” 
thus, lacking the potential to control human action (Bandura, 1986). 
It is the difference between the indiscriminate approval and the gen-
uine appreciation with promising outcomes that portrays the contin-
uum from dichotomous to the ordinal informative level of social rec-
ognition (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001). 
Regulatory mechanism. If the predictive properties of social recog-
nition represent its motivational power, then the basic human capa-
bility of forethought (Bandura, 1986) is the means to cognitively op-
erationalize it. In particular, based on the social recognition received 
and, thus, the perceived prediction of desired consequences to come, 
people will self-regulate their future behaviors by forethought. By us-
ing forethought, employees may plan courses of action for the near 
future, anticipate the likely consequences of their future actions, and 
set performance goals for themselves. Thus, people first anticipate 
certain outcomes based on recognition received, and then through 
forethought, initiate and guide their actions in an anticipatory fash-
ion. The future acquires causal properties by being represented cog-
nitively by forethought exercised in the present (Bandura, 1986,1997). 
The forethought is the regulatory mechanism that allows perceived 
future outcomes (based on social recognition) to be transferred into 
current action. 
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Differential Engagement and Synergistic Effect Hypotheses 
To sum, money fosters effort, feedback clarifies the task role, and so-
cial recognition predicts future outcomes. Effort, role clarity, and ex-
pectations of valued outcomes are likely individually related to task 
performance, which makes them necessary ingredients in the pro-
posed multifaceted motivational domain. Based on the theory pro-
posed, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: Each reinforcer in behavioral management-
money, feedback, and social recognition-produces a positive 
average effect on task performance. 
With regard to the within-group systematic variance explained, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypotheses 4: Each reinforcer — money, feedback, and social 
recognition — produces a significant within-group homogene-
ity of effect sizes. 
In terms of overall effectiveness, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 5: Money, feedback, and social recognition applied 
in combination have the strongest average effect on task per-
formance, as compared to the average effect of each of the 
three reinforcers used individually. This combined average ef-
fect is synergistic (greater than the sum of the effects of indi-
vidual reinforcers).
Comparisons among the Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 will allow us to de-
termine if a synergistic effect of the combined intervention is present. 
In particular, Hypothesis 3 establishes the individual reinforcement 
effects, Hypothesis 4 allows for unambiguous interpretation, and the 
first part of Hypotheses 5 shows the actual model in place. 
A Meta-Analysis of Behavioral Management 
Identification of the Studies 
The collection of studies was initiated by computerized searches of ABI 
Inform, Business Periodicals Index, PsychInfo, PsychLit, Social Science 
Sta jkovic  &  Luthans  in  Personnel  Psycholo gy  56   (2003)       13
Index, and Sociofile databases, covering the 20th century. The key 
words used were behavior management, organizational behavior man-
agement, behavior modification, organizational behavior modification, 
reinforcement theory, and applied behavior analysis. Most recent ar-
ticles that may not have been covered yet by computerized databases, 
were manually searched for in the following 10 journals: Academy of 
Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administra-
tive Science Quarterly, Journal of Management, Journal of Organiza-
tional Behavior, Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, Be-
havior Modification, Journal of Applied Behavioral Analysis, Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science, Journal of Applied Psychology, Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Personnel Psychology, 
and Psychological Bulletin. 
Searches (limited to articles in the English language) were also con-
ducted using reference sections of relevant reviews and books (Andra-
sik, 1979,1989; Bandura, 1969; Bobb & Kopp, 1978; Kluger & DeNisi, 
1996; Komaki et al., 1996; Luthans & Kreitner, 1975,1985; Luthans & 
Martinko, 1987; Mayhew, Enyart, & Cone, 1979; Merwin et al., 1989; 
O’Hara et al., 1985; Rapp, Carstenson, & Prue, 1983; Stajkovic & Lu-
thans, 1997), as well as using an ancestry approach (Cooper, 1989). 
Unpublished manuscripts were also solicited from researchers in this 
field. 
Selection Criteria 
Because behavioral management research has been conducted across 
many disciplines over the past 6 decades, we start by defining the 
boundaries of our work. This study is about the effects of behavioral 
management on task performance in organizational settings. This pur-
pose places several limits on the scope and nature of this meta-anal-
ysis, which are identified next. 
Inclusion Requirements 
Reinforcement interventions. The main premise of behavioral man-
agement is that human behavior is a function of contingent conse-
quences (Bandura, 1969; Luthans & Kreitner, 1985). Thus, to be in-
cluded in this meta-analysis, a study was first required to: (a) have 
used one or more of the three reinforcers (money, feedback, social 
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recognition), (b) have the reinforcer (s) contingently administered, 
and (c) apply the reinforcer (s) as an external intervention. 
Outcome measures. A study also had to examine the dependent vari-
able (s) in the form of behavior-based, task-performance measures. 
Based on the behavioral management paradigm, every behavior iden-
tified for change had to be: (a) observable, (b) measurable, (c) task 
specific, and (d) performance related (Luthans, Paul, & Baker, 1981; 
Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997). Using Wood‘s (1986) theory of task as a 
theoretical guideline, we defined task performance “in terms of the 
behavioral responses [italics added] a person should emit in order to 
achieve some specified level of performance” (p. 62). More specifi-
cally, task performance had to include three major components of any 
task such as (a) product of the task, (b) required acts necessary to per-
form the task, and (c) information cues on which a person can base 
the judgment about the execution of the task (Campbell, 1988; Kluger 
& DeNisi, 1996; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998; Wood, 1986). 
Analytical aspects. Finally, a study was also required to provide the 
minimum statistical information necessary to calculate effect sizes. If 
effect size transformations were needed, we used equations provided 
by Hedges (1981,1982), Rosenthal (1991,1994), and Stajkovic (1999). 
Exclusion Criteria 
Nonrelated settings. Our focus on employee performance in orga-
nizational settings placed further restraints on the scope of applica-
ble studies. In particular, studies were excluded if they: (a) included 
tasks performed in laboratory/simulated settings, (b) analyzed gen-
eral work behaviors (e.g., absenteeism), (c) examined the impact of 
reinforcers on behaviors unrelated to performances in organizational 
settings (e.g., oral reading errors of children), (d) used samples from 
clinical institutions that would typically be rarely found as a major-
ity of the work force (e.g., individuals with disabilities), (e) investi-
gated the effects of reinforcers on performance in the field of sports 
psychology and medicine, and (f) included study participants who, 
considering their age, legally cannot be in the work force (e.g., those 
younger than 15 years of age). 
Final selection of the studies. Initially, 279 studies appeared to 
have met the selection criteria. However, after closely examining 
each of these studies, an additional 207 studies were excluded for 
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methodological and/or conceptual reasons such as: (a) not being con-
ducted in an organizational setting, (b) the use of same data from pre-
vious studies already selected for the analysis, (c) not reporting the de-
scription of the task, (d) not reporting any statistical information from 
which effect sizes could be determined either directly or through the 
use of statistical transformations, (e) examining behavioral intentions 
or choice options rather than task performance, (f) using cognitive an-
tecedents as outcome predictors, (g) applying nonsystematic, random 
reinforcement, and (h) developing interventions based on self-gener-
ated rewards. The final sample consisted of s = 72 (26%) studies, gen-
erating k = 350 effect sizes, and a total sample size of N = 13,301. The 
average sample size per effect size was 38 study participants. 
Primary Meta-Analysis 
In this analysis, we examine three research questions: (a) What is the 
weighted average effect size of the behavioral management on perfor-
mance in organizational settings? (b) Is that average effect size sig-
nificantly different from zero? and (c) Are individual estimates of ef-
fect sizes homogeneous across all examined studies? These questions 
addressed Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Method 
In this study, we used the Hedges and Olkin (1985) meta-analytic 
method (see also Hedges, 1986). The computational equations, pro-
cedures, and analytical tests used have been outlined in detail by 
Stajkovic (1999), and were also used in previous research (e.g., 
Stajkovic & Luthans 1997,1998; Stajkovic & Lee, 2002). Below, we 
describe these analytical procedures. 
Estimating individual effect sizes. We started the analysis by esti-
mating the single effect size for each study in the form of index (g), 
which represents the mean difference between the experimental and 
the control group divided by the pooled standard deviation. If some 
studies did not report estimates to directly determine effect size (g), 
we used transformational equations (Hedges, 1981, 1982; Rosenthal, 
1991, 1994) to compute it. Because, for small sample sizes (n < 10), 
(9) has a slight tendency to overestimate population effect size δ, we 
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next multiplied (g) with the correction factor that produces an unbi-
ased estimator (d) (Hedges, 1981; Hedges & Olkin, 1985). The unbi-
ased estimator (d) for every effect size (g) has an approximately nor-
mal sampling distribution when all studies share a common effect size 
with the mean δ and variance (v), where (v) is determined by the sam-
ple sizes and the value of (d) (Hedges, 1986). 
Outlier analysis. We conducted three outlier analyses: for n = 
1, effect size magnitudes, and sample sizes (e.g., Stajkovic, 1999; 
Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997,1998). The main reason for a priori exclu-
sion of single case studies was the strong possibility for capitaliza-
tion on chance that would preclude reliable external validity gener-
alization of the findings. Distributional properties of effect size (d.) 
(see Hedges & Olkin, 1985) also contributed to this exclusion from 
further analyses. The problem with unusually high effect size mag-
nitudes is that, given the high power of the x2 test, they may keep on 
indicating the presence of systematic variance (significant within-
group heterogeneity) that may not be (practically) meaningful in the 
organizational reality (Hunter & Schmidt, 1995). The issue with the 
presence of large sample sizes is that weighted averages tend to give 
a much larger weight to studies with large sample sizes, which can 
cause the entire meta-analysis to be defined by one or a few studies 
(Hunter & Schmidt, 1995). 
We used a schematic plot analysis (Wey, 1977) to conduct outlier 
analyses (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997,1998). The values placed 1.5 to 3 
lengths from the upper/lower edge of the 50% interquartile range of 
all values represent outliers, and values that are more than 3 lengths 
from the interquartile range are considered extreme values. Upper 
and lower “viskers” represent the highest and lowest values that are 
not considered outliers. We conducted three analyses: with all stud-
ies (Set l), with magnitude (Set Z), and with sample size (Set 3) out-
liers excluded. 
Combining estimates of individual effect sizes. The most accurate 
and valid procedure for combining estimates of single effect sizes is 
to calculate a weighted average effect size that incorporates variances 
(vi) to (vk) for each (di) to (dk) (Hedges, 1986; Hedges & Olkin, 1985). 
Thus, we computed the weighted average effect size (d.) across k stud-
ies by weighting each effect size by the inverse of its variance. After 
determining the weighted average effect size (d.) and its variance (v.), 
we tested the hypothesis that the common population effect size δ = 0, 
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by comparing the ratio of (d.2/v.2) to) the χ2 distribution for df = 1. In 
other words, we intended to determine if there was a significant main 
effect for the average treatment across k studies. 
Testing for homogeneity of effect sizes. Weighted average effect size 
(d.) represents an unbiased estimate of the population effect size only 
if individual effect size magnitudes do not deviate from each other 
across all k studies by more than what is expected by chance, in which 
case, the estimates differ only by unsystematic variance and we can 
conclude that the model of the average effect size fits the data. How-
ever, significant heterogeneity of effect sizes indicates that differ-
ences in individual effect size magnitudes may be large enough to re-
ject the homogeneity assumption that single effect sizes are drawn 
from the same population (presence of the significant treatment-by-
study interaction, or, in other words, moderation) (Hedges, 1982,1986; 
Hedges & Olkin, 1985). For this test, we used the &t homogeneity sta-
tistic (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Stajkovic, 1999), which represents the 
weighted sum of squares of the effect size estimates (di) to (dk) about 
the weighted mean (d.). 
Results of the Primary Meta-Analysis 
Average effects and homogeneity assumption. In the first set of stud-
ies that excluded studies with only one subject (s = 3; k = 14), the av-
erage unbiased effect size (d.) was .98, with variance (v.) of .0002. 
These results indicated a significant effect of behavioral management 
on performance (χ(1)
2 = 4788, p < .01; 95% CIL = .951, CIU = 1.01), and 
a significant heterogeneity of individual effect sizes across the k exam-
ined studies (QT = 8879,57, p < .01). After removing magnitude out-
liers and extreme values (s = 7; k = 41) in the second set of studies, 
d. = .51, and v. = .0002, which also showed a significant effect (χ(1)
2 
= 1287, p < .01; 95% CIL = .48, CIU = .54) and significant heterogene-
ity of individual effect sizes (QT = 2142.51, p < .01). In the final data 
set, where sample size outliers/extreme values were excluded (s = 6, 
and k = 11), the magnitude of average effect size was d. = .47, and v. 
= .0002. This average effect size also indicated a significant effect for 
behavioral management on performance (χ(1)
2 = 731.63, p < .01; 95% 
CIL = .44, CIU = .50) and further reduction, although still significant, 
in the within-group heterogeneity of effect sizes (QT = 1627,25, p < 
.01). These results supported Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
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Implications of outlier analysis. Implications of outlier exclusions 
were in accordance with the previous research (Behrens, 1997; Hedges, 
1987; Hunter & Schmidt, 1995; Stajkovic, 1999). Thus, to avoid biases 
introduced by single-subject studies, large magnitudes that may be in-
creasing the heterogeneity of effect sizes, yet as Hunter and Schmidt 
(1995) suggest, may not be meaningful in organizational reality, and 
larger weights given for the sample size deviant studies, further anal-
yses were conducted with the outlier and extreme values removed. 
These reductions represent below average reductions in the social sci-
ences (10%; Hunter & Schmidt, 1995), and notably below reductions 
in the “exact” sciences (40%; Hedges, 1987). 
Heterogeneity of individual effect sizes. Given the diverse attributes 
of the studies we meta-analyzed, as hypothesized, within-group het-
erogeneity assumption was supported (QT = 1627,25, p < .01). This 
finding indicated that: (a) magnitudes of single effect sizes were not 
consistent among each other, (b) there was significant treatment-by-
study interaction, and, most importantly, (c) it was inappropriate to 
specify the predictive model by an average estimate of effect size with-
out considering moderators. Thus, based on the theory proposed, we 
tested the moderation model of the hypothesized sources of system-
atic variations among examined studies. 
Meta-Analytic Moderator Analysis 
Coding of Studies 
Following the theory proposed, each study was coded for the type of 
reinforcement applied such as (a) money, (b) feedback, (c) social rec-
ognition, (d) Combination 1 (simultaneous application of money and 
feedback), (e) Combination 2 (application of money and social recog-
nition), ( f ) Combination 3 (application of feedback and social recog-
nition), and (g) Combination 4 (application of money, feedback, and 
social recognition). Data were coded by the principal investigator in 
this study and another trained rater. The interrater agreement was 
p = .97, and the “effective” reliability was R = .98, indicating that a 
similar group of two other judges would reach almost the same con-
clusions regarding coded variables (Rosenthal, 1991). 
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Analytical Procedures 
According to Hedges and Olkin’s (1985) meta-analytic method, we 
performed several tests to explain the nature of the moderation. We 
examined the homogeneity of effect sizes among moderator groups 
by the Q b homogeneity test. To determine if the moderator groups 
explained the study-by-treatment interaction found in the primary 
meta-analysis, we examined homogeneity of effect sizes within each 
group by the Qw homogeneity test, which represents an overall test 
of homogeneity of effect sizes within the partitioned groups across k 
studies. Finally, extending the between-group homogeneity Qb test, 
we used meta-analytic orthogonal polynomials for the three planned 
comparisons. 
Results of the Moderator Meta-Analysis
Based on the coded categories, all studies were split into seven groups. 
The average effect sizes indicated that each type of reinforcer and 
combination had a significant effect on performance. The between-
group homogeneity test showed that different types of reinforcers had 
significantly different effects on performance (QB = 214.21, p < .01). 
The test for overall within-group homogeneity of effect sizes showed 
significant heterogeneity of effect sizes within the reinforcer catego-
ries (Qw = 1413.04, p < .01). However, the analysis of effect size homo-
geneity for each moderator group (QB1-7) indicated that within-group 
homogeneity was achieved for social recognition and Combination 4. 
Table 1 shows the results of this analysis. 
We next performed homogeneity adjustments (Hedges, 1987; 
Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998) for the moderator groups with significant 
within-group heterogeneity of effect sizes. For deviant data, “Tukey 
(1960) and Huber (1980) recommended deletion of the most extreme 
10% of data points-the largest 5% and the smallest 5%-0f values” 
(Hunter & Schmidt, 1990, p. 207). Because removing a priori 10% of 
the most extreme heterogeneity values may be more than is needed 
to achieve within-group homogeneity, we used procedures based 
on the values of individual QwIIi–p homogeneity statistics and corre-
sponding moving ZII+i–p weighted averages to analyze the within-group 
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homogeneity of effect sizes (Hedges, 1987; Stajkovic, 1999) while re-
moving the most extreme values one at a time (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). 
Table 2 shows these results.
Results of the Adjusted Moderator Analysis 
After performing homogeneity adjustments, we re-ran the modera-
tor analysis with the data after the within-group homogeneities were 
achieved. Table 3 shows these results. 
After distribution bias corrections, outlier analyses, and homogene-
ity adjustments, all three reinforcers and the three combinations still 
showed significant effects on performance (see Figure 2 as percent-
age improvement in performance), which supported Hypotheses 3. 
The test for between-group homogeneity of effect sizes revealed that 
the magnitudes of the different reinforcers were significantly different 
from each other (QB = 1166.09, p < .01), reaffirming the results from 
the unadjusted moderator analysis. Finally, within-group homogene-
ity of effect sizes was achieved for six out of seven moderator groups, 
which largely supported Hypothesis 4. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Type of Intervention Moderator Analysis 
Type of 
                                          95% Confidence limits 
Interventiona  d.  v.  Lower  Upper  χ 2 b  k  QWi
c 
Money  .99 .0029 .8825 1.096 328.55** 37 256.81**
Feedback  .34 .0004 .3055 .3839 297.00** 174 880.66**
Social recognition  .51 .0367 .1356  .8864 7.11** 8 1.46††
C1  .53 .0124 .3144 .7517 22.82** 16 41.99**
C2  .73 .0140 .5018 .9656 38.45** 7 80.08**
C3  .60 .0034  .4887 .7171 106.90** 37 147.44**
C4  1.88 .0260  1.563 2.195 135.76** 5 4.60††
a. C1 = Combination 1  (simultaneous application of money and feedback);  
C2 = Combination 2  (simultaneous application of money and social recognition);  
C3 = Combination 3  (simultaneous application of feedback and social recognition);  
C4 = Combination 4  (simultaneous application of money, feedback, and social 
recognition). 
b. χ2=d.2/v. 
c. Within-group homogeneity statistic. 
** p < .01 ;  * p < .05 ; †† p > .05 
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Table 2. Adjustments for the Within-Group Homogeneity of Effect Sizes 
Adjustments  Qw-ext.  Qw  Qw-min  Qw-max d.  k  QwiA 
Money 
Unadjusted  - 6.94 .00  55.87 .99  37 256.81**
1 55.87 5.55 .00 54.15 .93 36 199.65**
2 54.15 4.12 .00 50.63 .86 35 144.15**
3 50.63 2.71 .03  13.61 .79 34 92.08**
4  13.61 2.35 .02 11.59 .74 33 77.60**
5 11.59 2.06 .01  8.44 .72 32 65.93**
6 8.44 1.85 .00  7.93 .71 31 57.42**
7  7.93 1.64 .00 5.82 .68 30 49.34†
Combination 1 
Unadjusted  - 2.62 .00 13.11 .53 16 41.99**
1  13.11 1.91 .00  7.90 .48 15 28.67†
Combination 2 
Unadjusted  - 11.44 3.43 57.31 .73 7 80.08**
1  57.31 .01 .00 .01 .07 6 .03††
Combination 3 
Unadjusted  - 3.98 .00 28.04 .60  37 147.44**
1 28.04 3.30 .00 25.24 .56 36 118.95**
2  25.24 2.65 .00  22.11 .50 35 92.73**
3  22.11 2.65 .00  20.47 .44 34 69.68**
4 20.47  1.49 .00 11.91 .42 33 49.01†
Qw-ext. = Highest extreme value of the individual homogeneity statistic within the 
moderator group
Qw = Mean value of the individual homogeneity statistic within the moderator group 
after (Qw-ext.) has been removed
Qw-min = Minimum value of the individual homogeneity statistic within the moderator 
group after the (Qw-ext.) has been removed; 
Qw-max = Maximum value of the individual homogeneity statistic within the moderator 
group after (Qw-ext.) has been removed; 
(d.) = Average effect size for the moderator group after (Qw-ext.) has been removed; 
k = Number of effect sizes after (Qw-ext.) has been removed 
Qwi A = Overall homogeneity value for the moderator group after (Qw-ext.) has been 
removed 
Combination 1 (simultaneous application of money and feedback) 
Combination 2 (simultaneous application of money and social recognition)
Combination 3 (simultaneous application of feedback and social recognition) 
Given the scope of this analysis, feedback adjustments are available from the authors. 
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; † p > .01 ; †† p > .05 
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Orthogonal Polynomials 
Individual reinforcers versus Combination 4. The above two analysis 
set the necessary methods stage for testing Hypothesis 5. In particu-
lar, significant within-group homogeneity of effect sues allowed us to 
unambiguously interpret any subsequent results, and significant be-
tween group heterogeneity of effect sizes indicated differences among 
the magnitudes of different reinforcers. However, being an omnibus 
between-group differences estimator, the QB test does not reveal (un-
less in case of only two groups) the source of differences in magni-
tudes of effect sizes. Thus, although effect size magnitudes were in a 
hypothesized direction, to statistically test our Hypothesis 5, we next 
performed meta-analytic orthogonal polynomials to examine pairwise 
magnitude differences among hypothesized comparisons (Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998; Stajkovic & Lee, 2002). The 
results (presented in Table 4) supported Hypothesis 5 (for all three 
comparisons), where the Combination 4 (simultaneous application of 
money, feedback, and social recognition) had a significantly higher 
impact on performance than either money, feedback, or social recog-
nition applied individually. 
Table 3. Summary Statistics for Type of Intervention Adjusted Moderator Analysis
Type 
                                                       95% Confidence limits 
of Interventiona  d.  v.  Lower  Upper  x2b  k  QWic 
Money .68  .0035  .5683  .8001  133.74** 30  49.34†
Feedback  .29  .0005  .2451  .3327  167.00* 157  330.05**
Social recognition  .51  .0367  .1356  .8864  7.11**  8  1.46††
C1  .48  .0126  .2614  .7014  18.38**  15  26.67†
C2  .07  .0196  -.2083  .3397  .22  6  .03††
C3  .42  .0038  .2948  .5364  633.19**  33  49.01†
C4 1.88  .0260  1.563  2.195  135.76** 5  4.60††
a. C1= Combination 1  (simultaneous application of money and feedback);  
C2 = Combination 2  (simultaneous application of money and social recognition);  
C3 = Combination 3  (simultaneous application of feedback and social recognition);  
C4 = Combination 4  (simultaneous application of money, feedback, and social 
recognition). 
b. χ2 = d.2/v. 
c. Within-group homogeneity statistic. 
** p < .01 ; * p < .05 ; † p > .01 ; †† p > .05 
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Additive, redundant, or synergistic model. These results allowed us 
to determine if the combined effect of the three reinforcers is additive, 
redundant, or synergistic. An additive model would show an average 
effect size for the combined (C4) intervention (simultaneous appli-
cation of money, feedback, and social recognition) as a sum of effects 
sizes of all individual reinforcers (money, feedback, and social rec-
ognition) comprising the combined intervention. The average effect 
Figure 2. The Percentage Effects of Reinforcement Interventions on Employee Per-
formance. C1 = Combination 1  (simultaneous application of money and feedback; 
C2 = Combination 2  (simultaneous application of money and social recognition; C3 
= Combination 3  (simultaneous application of feedback and social recognition; C4 
= Combination 4  (simultaneous application of money, feedback, and social recog-
nition; SR = Social recognition; FB = Feedback. 
Table 4. Individual Versus Combined Reinforcement Effects on Performance 
Intervention                                                                     95% Confidence limits 
comparisona  γb  vγ
c  Lower  Upper
Money vs. C4  1.2  .0295  .8634  1.536 
Feedback vs. C4  1.6  .0265  1.271  1.909 
Social recognition vs. C4  1.4  .0627  .8793  1.861 
a. C4  (simultaneous application of money, feedback, and social recognition) 
b. γ = Value of the contrast estimate;
c. vγ = Variance of the contrast estimate
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size d. for the C4 under the redundant model would show lower value 
(overlap in effects), whereas under the synergistic model it would 
show greater value, indicating the interaction among the three rein-
forcers applied simultaneously. Using the effect size data from Table 
3, we can show that under the additive model, the expected value of 
d. for C4 would be 1.48 (.68 + .29 + .51), and the actual value for C4 
is in fact d. = 1.88. These results reveal the synergistic nature of the 
effects of combined reinforcers on performance. A simple calculation 
shows that the synergistic model has a 21% greater effect on perfor-
mance than the additive model. 
. 
Probability of Success of Various Reinforcers 
The study results lend themselves to a useful presentation for practic-
ing managers through an applied index of magnitude of effect size—
probability of success (PS)—which has recently been introduced in pre-
senting empirical research (Grissom, 1994). Although not necessarily 
new to statisticians (Wolfe & Hogg, 1971), and sometimes also called 
the common language effect size (McGraw & Wong, 1992), or proba-
bility of superiority (Grissom, 1994), PS indicates the extent to which 
a randomly selected person from one treatment condition is likely to 
obtain a higher score on the dependent variable than the randomly 
selected person from another or no treatment (see Grissom, 1994 for 
mathematical/calculation details). 
In addition to Grissom’s (1994) call to include the PS index in meta-
analyses, we also find this index useful in presenting the practical util-
ity of research results. Thus, based on the effect sizes from our study, 
we present the PS index for each reinforcer (see Figure 3). Adapt-
ing the definition of PS to a language with more practical interpre-
tation, our findings presented through the PS index simply suggest 
the percentage probability that the reinforced employee will “outper-
form” the nonreinforced one. Reporting PS estimates (in addition to 
research-based meta-analytic indices) should help managers in prac-
tically evaluating the impact of each reinforcer. This is important be-
cause research suggests (Rauschenberger & Schmidt, 1987; Schmidt & 
Hunter, 1998) that presenting final statistical estimates in more prac-
tical terms helps managers arrive at a better understanding of, as Wil-
liams (1999) puts it, “what really works.” 
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Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to meta-analyze the effects of behav-
ioral management on task performance in organizations. We reviewed 
the theoretical background of behavioral management, analyzed em-
pirical findings from all available studies, and examined alternative 
models of combined reinforcement effects. This study represents the 
first time that an entire domain of behavioral management has been 
meta-analyzed, which can be used as a point of departure for further 
research and practice. As Hunter and Schmidt (1995) note: “the re-
sults of meta-analysis are indispensable for theory construction,” for 
“to construct theories, we must first know some of the basic factors, 
such as the empirical relations among variables.” (pp. 39-40) 
Figure 3. Probability of Success for Adjusted Effect Sizes. C1 = Combination 1  (si-
multaneous application of money and feedback; C2 = Combination 2  (simultane-
ous application of money and social recognition; C3 = Combination 3  (simultaneous 
application of feedback and social recognition; C4 = Combination 4  (simultaneous 
application of money, feedback, and social recognition; SR = Social recognition; FB 
= Feedback.
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Primary Meta-Analysis 
After all methodological corrections, adjustments, outlier analyses, 
primary meta-analysis, moderator and adjusted moderator analyses, 
and orthogonal polynomials analyses, our results show a strong im-
pact of behavioral management on task performance. However, the 
numerous findings we generated need to be considered one at a time, 
for they mean different things in different analyses. In particular, in 
the primary meta-analysis, we found a significant main effect of be-
havioral management on performance of (d.) = .47. This average ef-
fect size, which was adjusted for overestimation bias and magnitude 
and sample size outliers, represents a 16% improvement in perfor-
mance (Glass, 1976), and 63% probability of success (Grissom, 1994). 
However, because we also found significant within-group heterogene-
ity of effect sizes, this finding should be interpreted with caution be-
cause it indicates the presence of unaccounted for systematic variance. 
Moderator Meta-Analysis 
Our goal in the moderator analysis was to theoretically explain the un-
accounted for systematic variance found in the primary meta-analysis, 
and to test the moderation model. We aimed to show the differences 
in effects on performance between the three most commonly used in-
dividual reinforcers-money, feedback, and social recognition-and the 
combined intervention of all three applied simultaneously. However, 
getting to this point meta-analytically required several steps. First, we 
found that the individual reinforcer types moderated the relationship 
between behavioral management and task performance: Each had a 
significant impact (significant average effect sizes), but with different 
effect magnitudes (significant between-group heterogeneity). How-
ever, before testing the relative differences among individual reinforc-
ers and the combined intervention, we needed to establish that the 
average effects for each group could be unambiguously interpreted 
(significant within-group homogeneity of effect sizes). After this was 
accomplished in adjusted moderator meta-analysis, we were able to 
proceed and test if the combined intervention had stronger effects on 
task performance than each reinforcer individually, and examine if 
those effects are additive, redundant, or synergistic. 
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Effects of Individual Reinforcers on Task Performance 
We found that money improved performance 23%, social recogni-
tion 17%, and feedback 10%. Two points are needed to make practi-
cal sense of these findings: (a) historical, in terms of their place in the 
field of behavioral management, and (b) empirical, in terms of rela-
tive comparisons. 
Historical context. Taken separately, the motivating power of money 
found in this study corroborates the original thoughts of management 
pioneers (e.g., Taylor, 1895), and substantiates other modern theory, 
research, and practice in various contexts (Heneman & Judge, 2000; 
Rynes & Gerhart, 2000). Except for some critical, but largely unsub-
stantiated views (e.g., Kohn, 1993), our findings and other existing re-
search strongly suggest that if applied contingently, as in behavioral 
management, money will lead to improved performance (Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1990; Gupta & Shaw, 1998; Lawler, 1981, 1990; Stajkovic 
& Luthans, 1997). 
Examined in its own terms, social recognition also significantly im-
proves performance. Given its intermittent properties, social recogni-
tion, tends to retain its motivational power over a long period of time 
(Bandura, 1986). Although personal attention has been theoretically 
recognized to play an important role in human action, as a reinforcer 
applied in organizations, social recognition has been relatively ignored 
(Bandura, 1986; Luthans & Stajkovic, 2000). Bandura (1986) notes 
that “it is difficult to conceive of a society populated with people who 
are completely unmoved by the respect, approval, and reproof of oth-
ers” (p. 235). Yet, as Miller (1978) long ago noted, social recognition is 
“one of the most neglected, taken for granted, and poorly performed 
management functions” (p. 115). Although managers have intuitively 
known the importance of providing social recognition for desirable be-
haviors, our meta-analysis provides evidence that social recognition 
does indeed have a significant impact on work performance. 
Finally, we found that, considered in its own right, feedback also 
had a significant impact on performance. Given its theorized out-
come utility, informative content, and especially, self-regulatory mech-
anism, feedback is a more complex construct than money and social 
recognition, and previous research support for it has been mixed (see 
Huger & DeNisi, 1996). Although feedback showed an increase in per-
formance of 10%, its complexity is evidenced in this study by being 
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the only reinforcer that was not able to reach within-group homoge-
neity of effect sizes eventer adjustments. As Ilgen, Fisher, and Tay-
lor (1979) pointed out, “to relate feedback directly to performance 
is very confusing. Results are contradictory and seldom straight for-
ward” (p. 368). The heterogeneity of effect sizes in the feedback in-
tervention shows what Ilgen et al. (1979) implicitly suggest: further 
presence of hard-to-identify variance. The complexity of feedback is 
also reflected theoretically, as conceptualized in control, goal setting, 
and social cognitive theories (see Bandura, 1997; Hollenbeck, 1989; 
Locke & Latham, 1990).
Relative comparisons. The second important point is that the three 
individual reinforcers could be considered individually in their own 
right, as we describe above, but probably should not be compared in 
terms of their relative effects. This is because, methodologically, meta-
analysis cannot account for the amounts of applications in each in-
tervention in individual studies, which are seldom, if ever, reported 
(e.g. controlling for level across the designs). For example, it is pos-
sible, although not empirically known, that one study may have used 
a large amount of money as opposed to a “pat on the back” for social 
recognition and/or vice versa (e.g., $1 as opposed to a full-page ad in 
a major newspaper). However, this (fixed vs. random effects/scal-
ing) issue is effectively dealt with, as we hypothesize, if each individ-
ual reinforcer (money, feedback, social recognition) is compared to 
the combined intervention (C4) applying all three reinforcers simul-
taneously. In this case, any differences in the strength of manipula-
tions across the three reinforcement groups are not confounded with 
the combined intervention because it includes all three individual re-
inforcers and their effective ranges. 
Relative Effects: Individual Reinforcers Versus Combined (C4) 
Intervention 
This analysis showed that the combined C4 intervention, applying all 
three reinforcers simultaneously, improved performance 45% (see 
Figure 2),3 and that it had stronger effects on performance than either 
3. The multiplicative effects are based on average effect size magnitudes, as re-
ported in Table 3. The percentage translations of effect sizes shows different re-
lationships because of the diminishing percentage returns on the standard normal 
Sta jkovic  &  Luthans  in  Personnel  Psycholo gy  56   (2003)       29
money, feedback, or social recognition applied separately (see Table 
4). These findings support our theorizing that each reinforcer covers 
a different aspect of the motivational domain. Thus, the key implica-
tion here is that although each reinforcer does work individually, when 
combined, they produced the strongest effect on work performance.
Combined Synergistic Effect 
The analysis also showed that combined reinforcers have a synergis-
tic effect on performance (21% greater effect on task performance 
than the additive model). As we theorize (money fosters effort, feed-
back clarifies the task, social recognition predicts outcomes), these 
results indicate a 3-way interaction among money, feedback, and so-
cial recognition. Conceptually examining 2-way combinations may 
help explain this interaction. In particular, combinations of any two 
of the three basic reinforcers have significant average effects, except 
for money and social recognition, which did not seem to match well. 
Even though separately money and social recognition had a significant 
impact on performance, when applied together they did not seem to 
work. As we theorize, this finding could be explained by the interper-
sonal nature of social recognition, impersonal aspects of money, and 
the clarifying nature of feedback. 
Previous research suggests that interpersonal trust, fairness, and 
caring conveyed by social recognition on the part of managers is con-
ducive to the creation of a “psychological contract” with employees 
(Pearce, 1987; Rousseau, 1990). Because the basis of a psychologi-
cal contract is the attachment of employees to the organization based 
on mutual respect and trust (Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau, 1994), 
the addition of money to this “contract” may introduce an imper-
sonal element potentially incongruent with an existing positive in-
terpersonal climate. It is not hard to imagine where one may get dis-
appointed (with detrimental effects on performance) at the hint of 
a monetary contingency in place of interpersonal trust, which, by 
distribution. For example (see Glass, 1976, for details), d. = 1 = 34% whereas, 
d. = 2 = 48% (d. = 3 = 49%) , so even the effect sue difference between d. = 1 
and d. = 2 is 1 (double) the percentage improvement difference is smaller than 
double (which would be 68%, 34% + 34%) and is 14%. Simple calculations de-
termine other percentage values for different values of average affect sizes (d.)
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definition assumes openness to vulnerability (MacAllister, 1995). How-
ever, when feedback is added to the combination of money and social 
recognition, the strongest effect on performance occurs. This implies 
that feedback information may not only mitigate the incongruency be-
tween social recognition and money, but fosters a 3-way interaction. 
In other words, feedback seems to provide the clarity to the money-
social recognition relationship needed to obtain not only significant 
but the strongest effect on task performance in organizations. 
To illustrate these interactions in simple terms (by comparing av-
erage effect sizes from Table 3), the combination of money and social 
recognition reduced the effect of money on performance 90% and the 
effect of social recognition 76% (the “mismatch cost” of combining 
impersonal and interpersonal reinforcers). Yet, the addition of feed-
back to the combination of money and social recognition multiplied 
the combined effects of money and social recognition 26.8 times, to 
produce the strongest effect on performance (the “information ben-
efit” of feedback in clarifying the apparent interpersonal/impersonal 
reinforcement conflict). 
Limitations and Future Research 
Task Complexity
 One limitation of behavioral management research is that most stud-
ies used low complexity tasks (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Komaki, 1986; 
Luthans & Kreitner, 1975,1985). For example (see also Appendix A), 
when Welsh et al. (1993) reported increases in productivity due to the 
reinforcement applications, the interventions focused on reinforcing 
behavioral responses in a blue collar manufacturing setting that ul-
timately led to increased production of goods. In addition, when Lu-
thans et al. (1981) reported increases in sales performance, they re-
inforced task-specific behaviors such as the timing of meeting the 
customer, percentage of restocking the shelves, and average distance 
from the assigned sales position. As another example of tasks used in 
this field, Haynes et al. (1982) increased safety performance by re-
inforcing specific driving practices of bus drivers, such as how many 
times they complied with the traffic signals, which, in turn, led to less 
accidents in driving city buses. 
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Although low complexity tasks have their place in every economy, 
high complexity tasks put greater demands on the employee’s (a) re-
quired knowledge, (b) cognitive ability, (c) memory capacity, (d) be-
havioral facility, (e) information processing, (f) persistence, and (g) 
effort (Bandura, 1986). As a result, the effectiveness of different re-
inforcers may change for complex tasks given the increased demands 
on behavioral and cognitive facilities of the task performer. For ex-
ample, the theory we propose suggests that different reinforcers im-
pact different aspects of the motivational process: Money fosters ef-
fort, feedback clarifies the work role, and social recognition predicts 
the occurrence of future desirable outcomes. This reasoning may ex-
plain the somewhat weak effects of feedback in our study, for low 
complexity tasks may call for more effort as opposed to feedback. On 
the other hand, as the task complexity increases, the role clarity pro-
vided by feedback may gain in importance (Wood, 1986). Thus, as a 
specific avenue for future research, we suggest that in behavioral man-
agement the effects of feedback on task performance may increase for 
more complex tasks. 
Based on the theory we propose, this proposed enhanced effects of 
feedback on complex tasks occurs because the motivating power of 
feedback generated from the information it provides about the em-
ployee’s performance tends to diminish on less complex tasks. The is-
sue on low complexity tasks is typically not clarifying the work role, 
as it is on complex tasks, but the (extra) amount of effort needed to 
perform the already known behaviors successfully (Kluger & DeNisi, 
1996; Kopelman, 1986). Thus, given its focus on clarifying the work 
role, feedback, though valuable, may not be as useful or motivating 
on less complex tasks given their more narrow and straightforward 
work demands. On the other hand, clarifying feedback information 
about a task becomes increasingly critical for more complex perfor-
mance (e.g., annual feedback for assistant professors, or high-tech 
managers), for it likely leads to improvements through the develop-
ment of more effective task strategies. These lines of future research 
may help us further understand the role various reinforcers play in 
work performance. 
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Fixed Versus Random Effects in Meta-Analysis 
In the “Relative comparisons” section, because of a methodological is-
sue, we provide an explicit cautionary note regarding making the rel-
ative comparisons of the effects of individual reinforcers. On a more 
technical note, the methodological issue regards the differences be-
tween fixed and random effects models in meta-analysis. 
In particular, as done in most meta-analysis, in this study, we used 
the fixed effects model of effect sizes. According to the fixed effect 
model, “all studies have the same (constant but unknown) effect size” 
(Hedges & Olkin, 1985, p. 189). Hence, the idea of and general research 
interest in average effect size. Test of homogeneity of effect sizes de-
termines if the single effect sizes are consistent with the fixed effects 
model, and, if not, theory is used to determine predictor variable (s) 
to explain single effect size deviations from each other (Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985, pp. 189-191). The random effects model “underlies the 
concept of a study’s true effect size as random,” where the idea of ran-
domness is coming “from a belief that the outcome of a process can-
not be predicted in advance… (Raudenbush, 1994, p. 302). Thus, in 
random effects model, “there is no single true or population effect of 
the treatment across studies. Rather, there is a distribution of true ef-
fects; each treatment implementation (site) has its own unique true 
effect” (Hedges & Olkin, 1985, p. 190). In the Bayesian approach, “the 
randomness of the true effect size represents the investigator’s sub-
jective uncertainty about the process that produces them” (Rauden-
bush, 1994, p. 303). 
Based on fixed versus random effect model distinctions, one cannot 
directly compare the relative effects of one reinforcer (e.g., money) 
versus the other (e.g., social recognition) without: (a) randomly sam-
pling all possible intervention levels, or (b) holding the level of the in-
terventions constant. Although technically we cannot argue with this 
point, we suggest that it represents a somewhat unrealistic view of 
the reality as it exists in the research literature. First, virtually no lit-
erature that one might meta-analyze is based upon studies where ef-
fects were created by random levels, including the classic work in psy-
chology, education, and medicine (see Hunt, 1997, for descriptions and 
details). Second, scaling research that would allow one to conclude 
that two interventions are of the same magnitude is also nonexistent. 
Finally, because the studies included in this meta-analysis are taken 
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from “real world” contexts, whatever ranges may be captured by the 
three individual reinforcers, they at least approximate the ranges that 
are typical or possible with each of the three reinforcers. 
Thus, from a normative perspective, we refrain from making com-
parisons among money, feedback, and social recognition.4 However, 
on a descriptive note, we do report their individual effects on task per-
formance and place them, in their own right, in a historical research 
context. Obviously, we call for future research that scales the rein-
forcement interventions or that uses random level designs. 
Implications for Practice 
Application Procedures: Hoping for A and Reinforcing A 
Given the potential for application of behavioral management in many 
domains of organizational functioning, it is important to recognize the 
implications of our results for more effective management of task per-
formance. The key practical implication from this study is that behav-
ioral management significantly impacts performance in organizations. 
However, after recognizing the effectiveness of behavioral manage-
ment, managers should pay close attention to implementation proce-
dures. Most practical applications fail because proper procedures as 
specified by theory are not followed. (Lawler, 1990; Kerr, 1999; Pfef-
fer, 1995,1998). For instance, although Pfeffer (1995) notes that “one 
of the oldest and most reliable findings in psychology is the princi-
ple of reinforcement” (p. 60) he also states that the “instability in re-
ward practices is not related to instability in underlying principles 
of human behavior; more likely, it is caused by … incomplete knowl-
edge of basic social science … [and] what we know about behavior” 
(p. 60). Similarly, Lawler (1990) concludes that process and design 
problems may limit the effectiveness of different reinforcers. He notes 
that although the applications of different reinforcers are meant to im-
prove employee behavior, they are many times aimed at “the wrong 
4. To simplify the discussion, we only refer in this section to the three individual 
reinforcers (e.g., money, feedback, social recognition). However, the discussion 
on fixed versus random effects could also be applied to the other three interven-
tions: C1, C2, and C3, as reported in the manuscript (e.g., Table 1 and Table 3).
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behavior” (Lawler, 1990, p. 58). Thus, a practical challenge is to fol-
low application procedures that are consistent with behavioral man-
agement principles, as outlined in the introduction of this article (see 
also Bandura, 1969; Kerr, 1999; Komaki, 1986; Lawler, 1990; Luthans 
& Kreitner, 1985; Luthans & Stajkovic, 1999; Pfeffer, 1995). 
Skill Building and Reinforcement 
Since Taylor’s scientific management over a hundred years ago, the 
major purpose of reinforcing employees has been to maintain and/
or increase their performance. However, many times, in addition to 
providing reinforcers, what is needed for performance improvement 
is further development of employees’ competencies through train-
ing programs that increase the knowledge of the task, improve skill 
levels, and help develop better task strategies. However, in these in-
stances, it is important to consider the possible byproduct of reinforc-
ing performance if the training is not provided. In particular, if the 
reinforcement has become very lucrative for the individual, this may 
lead unqualified people into believing that they can accomplish the 
performance level that, in fact, exceeds their objective ability and/or 
skills. In this case, applying desired reinforcers may be detrimental to 
the long-term interests of both the individual (repeated failures and 
stress) and the organization (quality problems, increased turnover 
rate). Thus, a managerial challenge here is to distinguish between re-
inforcing qualified people versus inflating the competence perceptions 
(by attractive reinforcers) of unqualified employees. 
Conclusion 
Although scholars and practicing managers have embraced the appli-
cation of behavioral management at work for about 3 decades (see 
Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Kopelman, 1986; Luthans & Kreitner, 1985; 
Pfeffer, 1995), scant attention had been paid to meta-analytically de-
termine the effectiveness of its entire domain as it is used in organi-
zations. In this new and uncertain economy, management scholars 
and organizational psychologists are frequently being cajoled to make 
their theories and research more practical and useful to managers 
(e.g., O’Reilly & Pfeffer, 2000). By providing meta-analytic findings 
regarding “what we know” so far about behavioral management, we 
feel that this study should help meet this important challenge. 
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